

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	China	REPORT NO.	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 120px; height: 20px;"></div>	25X1
SUBJECT	Chinese Communist Consolidation of Control in Chekiang, Anhwei, and Kiangsi Provinces	DATE DISTR.	23 July 1953	25X1
DATE OF INFO.	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 280px; height: 40px;"></div>	NO. OF PAGES	2	
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1. strict and rigidly enforced security controls had been extended by the Chinese Communists into mountainous and other relatively isolated areas such as the T'ienmu (N 30- , E 119-) Mountain district and South Anhwei Province, where hitherto the controls had never been strong; and the area including West Chekiang, South Anhwei, and East Kiangsi were garrisoned and patrolled by Communist troops. Ex-Nationalist officials and employees who formerly had been used by the Communists were cleaned out in repeated purges and replaced by Communist cadres who had been brought in to administer the local governments.
2. During 1952 the Communists devoted much attention to the welfare of the farmers and attempted to increase the production of their crops and improve their general status. Loans and other forms of aid were advanced by the government. Peasants in the Huai River valley had been successfully conducting lumber operations, and the government was buying their farm produce. As a result of programs such as these, the standard of living of the farmers was raised and they became averse to activity that might threaten their new-found prosperity.
3. Since the fall of 1952 every village in the area¹ had organized its own militia to preserve order in the vicinity. These militiamen were equipped with rifles and were the main strength of the local security forces. The fact that the local inhabitants were made responsible for the preservation of peace and order had an extremely dampening effect on anti-Communist activity. Guerrilla

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25X1 activity [redacted] was facing opposition from the people themselves. Acts of sabotage, while doing damage to the Communists, also caused harm to innocent persons and their property. Such incidents frequently aroused the people against the saboteurs, and the Communists successfully exploited this reaction by means of active propaganda.²

25X1 1. [redacted]

25X1 2. [redacted] Comment. People on the mainland were [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] not only apprehensive but also very suspicious of
25X1 anti-Communist activities, either on the mainland or
25X1 overseas. [redacted]

[redacted] Some of the factors underlying this attitude were strict Communist censorship and wide propaganda; the fact that guerrilla activity had been driven underground; the fact that neither the Nationalist government nor its allies had undertaken any major operations against the mainland; and the fact that propaganda activities from the West had virtually ceased. In short, there was a growing belief on the mainland that the Communists were unassailable.

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